Fiscal Competition Among Local Governments after Fiscal Decentralization by Kuncoro, Haryo
Business and Entrepreneurial Revierv, October 2005, page 48-56
rssN 0853-9  I  89
INTRODUCTION
Externalities have played an important role in the
public economic literature. For example, roads, public
transportation, recreatiorr, and cultural facilities are
visited, and therefore crowded by residents in nearby
jurisdictions. Crirne fighting in one jurisdiction could
either lower regional crime or push criminals into neigh-
boring communities. Air pollution controls and sewage
t rea tment  enhance the  env i ronment  qua l i t y  o f
borderingjurisdictions. Radio and TV broadcasts can
be seen away from the local border. Educational and
job training expenditures may translate in productivity
gains in workplaces outside the communify.
In the case of the efficiency of local public goods
provision, benefit spillovers or inter-jurisdictional
externalitiesarea widespread feature of many services
provided by local govemments (Wilson, 1986, 1999).
The significance of spillovers is widely recognized
in the fiscal federalism literature (see: for example
Oates, 1972;1999).  The general  conclusion of this
strand of literature is that externalities tent to cause a
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divergence between private and social costs and
benefits, and thus lead to suboptimal decision-making.
Some authors have also worried about the equity con-
sequences of spillovers (see, e.g., Ladd and Yinger,
1994), but also relating to the design of'needs-based'
equalization grants (Bramley, 1 990). The general policy
prescribed to deal with them is to delegate the authority
of decision making to the lower layer ofgovemments.
Indonesia provides a unique opportunity to
exam ine the nature of inter-j uri sd ictional externalities
within a country consisting of central, provincial, and
local levels of government. Since her independence
in 1945, the administration ofthe country's regional
public services operated through a hierarchical and
parallel system of de-concentrated central govern-
ment  agenc ies  and os tens ib ly  au tonomous ub-
national governrnents. Throughout most of its history
Indonesia's ystem ofregional government adminis-
tration has been among the most centralized in the
world (see for example Davey, 1989) and then
drast ical ly decentral ized since 2001. Given the
si gnifi cance of inter-regional redistribution performed
Fiscal Competition Among Local Governments after
Fiscal Decentralization
HARYO KUNCORO
Faculty of Economics, UPI YAI Jakarta
Jf. Salemtra Raya Jakarta Pusat, Mobile: 0817267325,emai|: haryo_kuncoro@hotmail.com
Accepted on May 2"d2005, Approved on August 7,h2005
Abstract: Spatial interaction among local governments in fiscal setting decisions is receiving
increasingly attention in the applied public economics literature. Spatial interaction models rely on the
presence ofan externality from local budgetmaking, that is external effects originate from inter-jurisdictional
resource flows due to tax competition for a mobile base, or from local public expenditure spillovers into
neighboring jurisdictions. Similarly, the intergovernmental grants competition exists when there is a rivalry
among local governments to get them from central government. This paper attempted to identify how
great the fiscal competition among local governments in Indonesia. Using spatial statistics, we concluded
that the fiscal competition among municipalities was greater compared to the pre fiscal decentralization
period. It seems that the local tax setting and expenditures decisions in particular municipality can be
attributed to the mimicking behavior to neighbor regions. Also, we found that the fiscal competit ion
among municipalit ies could be attributed negatively to the fiscal disparity. Those imply that in the
regional autonomy era the local governments tend to increase their local own revenue intensively and
demand for intergovernmental grants in order to finance their expenditures. In the long run, they could
lead to the high cost economy, worsening fiscal dependency, and inefficiency of local government
expenditures. Those findings above suggest hat the distribution of intergovernmental transfers among
regions should consider the local tax efforl and the services minimum standard plays an important role to
achieve the efficiency oflocal government expenditures.
Keyrvords: Fiscal competition, local govemment, decentralization, public expenditure, municipalities
Vol.  5" 2005
by the tax transfer system and equalization payments,
whether a part icular local government engages a
strategic interaction with anotlier local governments
in the surrounding areas is a political and economic
issue.
Strategic interaction in setting local taxes and
expenditures are two forms of tlie fiscalcompetition
among local governments beside intergovernmental
grants competition. Basically, tax setting and expen-
diture policies in a region might affect to other regions
policies. The root problem of those phenomena is the
existence of spatial correlatiott among local govern-
ments .  In  the  broader  sense,  in te r - ju r isd ic t iona l
competiti-on can be defined as rivalry among govem-
ments in which each government is tryingto win some
scarce beneficial resource or in wh ich each government
seek to avoid a particular cost (Kenyon, 1997).
In developed countr ies, a number of empir ical
studies concerning the issue have been conducted
(see for example: Gordon, l9B3: Wildasin, 1986;
Salmon, 1 987; Case et al., 1 993 ; Kelej ian and Robinson,
1993;  Bes ley  and Case,  1995;  Brueckner ,  1998;
Heyrdels and Vuchelen, 1998; Figlio, et al., 1999; and
Bivand and Szymanski, 1997; 2000). Unfortunately,
they tested the fiscal competition parlially focusing
on either tax or expenditr-rre aspects. In contrast, the
similar studies focusing on similar issue in developing
countries are rarely.
Some studies in Indonesia have been generally
concentrated to the fiscal imbalance between central
and local governments (see for example: Uppal and
Suparmoko, 1986; Bawazier, 1988; Akhmad, 1990;
Kuncoro, 1995; Indonesia Forum, 2000, Sidik, 2001).
In a quite simi lar spir i t ,  our approacl i  has three
significant differences. First, we employ spatial
statistics method to identify the fiscal interdependency
includingta4 expenditures, and subsidies among munici-
palities in a comprehensive way. Second, instead of
using a single fiscal regime, we compare the fiscal
interdependency among local governments in pre-
and post-decentralization periods. Finally, we identiS'
the relationship between fiscal inter-dependency and
fiscal equity (disparity) across local governments.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows:
Section 2 briefly summarized the existing literature
while Section 3 highlighted the previous results. The
methodology is described in the next section and to
report the main empirical results followed. Finally,
some concludins remarks are drawn.
MBTHODS
The earliest idea of inter-jurisdiction competition
( lJC) was del ivered by Tiebout (1956).  The key
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actors in his rnodel are individuals (consumer-voters)
who decided which (of many) local governments to
locate in,  based on their  needs for government
services and the public service/tax packages offered
by the various governments. Tiebout assumes that
individuals have complete knowledge of the various
government revenue and expenditure packages; that
individuals free to choose among a large number of
communities; and that individuals are fully mobile.
F u r t h e r m o r e ,  h e  a s s u m e s  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  n o
intercommunity spillover effects occured and that
each community is able to attain its optimal amount
at which the average cost of production on particular
package of pLrblic services is minimized.
To the extent on Tiebout's rather restrictive
conditions are met, goods and services provided by
suburban local governments will exhibit both locative
efficiency and productive efficiency. In Tiebout's
model, local taxes are benefit taxes, proportional to
the benefits from government services received by
households, rather than taxes based on ability to pay.
No redistribution of income takes place in his system
of local governments. The Tiebout's model can be
criticized for its restrictive assumptions. A crucial
shortcorning of li is model is that it does not include
business firms, so that it is not particularly helpful in
illuminating the phenomenon of IJC for economic
development.
The Oates-Schwab model ( l99l ) focuses on the
mobility of capital rather than households. They
assume that the local government's objective is to
maximize the welfare of its constituents, subject o
the applicable budget constraints. They also assume
that no beneficial or negative spillovers occurred and
that a sufficient number of local governments exist
to approximate a competitive market. Furthermore,
they assume that communit ies have complete
information about the wage benefits provided by the
location of business firms in their communities and
those f i rms can correct ly evaluate the tax and
expenditure packages offered by the var ious
communities. An implicit assumption in their model
is that economic development efforts by local
governments are costless.
The major result of the Oates-Schwab model is
that taxes on both households and business firms
become taxes beneficial. In the case of business
firms, communities neither subsidize them to locate
in their communities, nor tax them in excess of the
costs of public services provided to them. Instead
firms pay exactly the cost of the public services to
them. In this benefittax equilibrium, communities will
have no incentive to further increase subsidies to
businesses. If communities were supposed to do so,
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the cost in terms of forgone tax revenues or higher
public service costs would exceed any benefits in
the forrn of increased jobs or income. Like the Tiebor.rt
mode l ,  the  Oates-Schwab mode l  i s  devo id  o f
redistribution by local governments. No ability{o-pay
taxes are levied only benefit taxes. Inter-jurisdiction
competi t ion may not be equitable in the Oates-
Schwab world but it is productively and electively
efficient.
McGuire (  l99l  )  has bui l t  an i rr formal model of
IJC, which she labels "destructive competition" that
has less happy consequences. She assumes that
individuals have preferences for redistribution and
thus choose revenue systems that rely on ability-to-
pay taxes. McGuire fufther assumes that tlre natior.r's
population is heterogeneous in terms of income and
mobility. An optimal evel of public services and taxes
can be computed, one that conceivably coLrld be
attained in the case of zero rnobility of individuals or
businesses.
However, it will never be attained. Any single
jur isdict ion wi l l  have an incent ive to cut tax for
relatively wealthy and rnobile individLrals or businesses
in orderto lure them to relocate. Thejurisdiction would
hope to be able to use the revenue gairred from tlie
incoming wealthy to cut taxes for current residents
or to increase public seruices. The problem is that all
jurisdictions will have the same incentive to cut tax
for the wealthy and rnobile.
McGuire concludes t l rat  locat ive eff ic iency
cannot  be  ach ieved in  the  case o f  des t ruc t ive
competition. She argues that household mobility will
ensure that productive efficiency will be attained,
however,  as jur isdict ions seek to maximize their
attractiveness by minimizing the burden of their taxes
for given level of public seryices. In McGuire's model,
both horizontal and vertical inequities result from IJC.
Less mobi le individuals wi l l  encumber a higher tax
burdens than their more mobile counterpafis. Vertical
inequities will also result, as high-income taxpayers
benefit from selective tax relief.
Wolkoff( 1992) asks whether a formal model of
economic development programs can explain the
existence of some seemingly irrational public policies.
In his mind, jurisdictions use economic development
subsidies to try to induce potentially mobile firms to
stay in the community. Firms are of two types: those
that are potentially mobile and tlrose that are not. A
central  problern in Wolkoff 's model is that the
jur isdict ion cannot easi ly dist inguish between these
two fpes of finns. Both the firrns and the jurisdictions
engage in strategic behavior. The community decides
on the amount of the subsidy and the probability that
it will give a sLrbsidy when a finn requesting one.
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The firm decides on the amount of subsidy requested.
Wolkoff assumes that the community chooses the
amount of subsidy and probability of granting a
subsidy in order to maximize the expected value of
its action.
Wolkoff's model explains two types of seeming
irrat ional i t ies in exist ing economic development
programs. Assuming that all finns request he same
subsidy, whether they are potentially rnobile or not.
The community then has no way of distinguishing
between the two types of firms. It turns out that the
most advantageous trategy for tlie community is to
offer modest subsidies to all firms. The inevitable
result is that some firrns with no relocation potential
will also receive the subsidy. It seems like a waste of
funds from the perspective ofcommunity with rational
maximizing behavior.
An alternative scenario outlined by Wolkoff is
based on a cornmunity's effoft to separate potentially
mobile from immobile firms. To do this, the community
makes subsidy awards become uncertain. Immobile
f i rms then reduce the amount of their  subsidy
requests. The community ends up avoiding large
subsidies to firrns that have no possibilitr, of relocating.
However, at the same time, the community rejects
the requests of, and thereby loses, some mobile firms.
In isolation, the fact of providing insufficient economic
development subsidies to certain mobile firms appears
irrational. Wolkoff's pointed out that lve cannot look
at such phenomena in isolation.
From Besley and Case ( 1995), the exit optirnum
is less irnporlant; it did not describe xplicitly in their
model, but its existence acknowledged. Instead, vote
is a key to the accountability of elected officials.
Imperfect information is also crucial to the Besley-
Case model. Politicians more aware about the cost
of providing public services than voters, and voters
used the information about tax change in neighboring
jr-rrisdictions to evaluate the performance of their
incumbents. Pol i t ic ians corne in two types: good
politicians rvho do no rent-seeking and bad politicians
who do ren t -seek ing .  Po l i t i c ians  use  s t ra teg ic
behavior in their tax-setting in order to influence
voters' opinion regarding whether they are good or
bad politicians. Voters will not reelect the incumbents
whom they j udge by their tax changes, relative to the
tax  changes o f  ne ighbor ing  ju r isd ic t ions ,  a re
considered bad pol i t ic iarrs.
The Besley-Case model is tikely most applicable
to interstate competition because the smaller numbers
of states rnake the strategic behavior of state
politicians are easier to monitor. This rnodel also could
apply to suburbs in metropolitan area if only the
number of competing suburbs were not too many.
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The Besley-Case model does not i l luminate the
impl ication s of IJC phenomenon for economic develop-
ment. Their decision to minimize the impoftance of
interstate mobility rnay irnply to an impression that
state officials are oversensitive of threats from high-
income taxpayers or business to exit.
Breton (1996) formulates a general theory of
competitive governments. His model ofpLrblic finance
and politics encompasses a wide range of competitive
situations: cornpetition for the support of the govemed
within governments, competition between govem-
ments and othersocial institutions, competition between
governments at different levels (for example, between
states and local governments), and competition that
is the subject of this paper-competition between
governments at the same level, or IJC. He assumes
that individuals eek to maximize utility and govem-
ments seek to maximize expected consent.
In his treatment of IJC, he includes both implicit
competi t ion (Tiebout mechanism) and yardst ick
competition. Both are generally present iri IJC, but in
a pure Tiebout world, Breton corectly notes, yardstick
competi t ion cannot exist .  I f  the Tiebout rnodel
operated perfectly, the population would sorl itself
by preference for publicly provided goods until each
community was homogenous and different from every
other community. Tl-ren, individuals could not use the
performance of neighboring governments to judge
the  per fo rmance o f  the i r  own governments ;
governments would be too much different from each
other in terms of their public service/tax packages.
That a jurisdiction's policy may be influenced by
otherjur isdict ion's pol ic ies has been recognized by
several authors (Hettich and Winer, 1984; Salmon,
1987). Still, it has not empirically reached the status
of general acceptance. The conventional approach
to modeling taxing and spending decisions consist of
explaining tlre level of composition of revenues and
expenditures by economic, political, and sociological
characteristics of the jurisdiction itself(for suryey, see:
Inman, 1988). However, a casual look at daily politics
suggests that voters and politicians are case sensitive
to events outside their geographical boLrndaries.
Three models have been offered in the local
public finance literatr.rre to justify the existence of
spatial interaction among local govemments. and have
been tested intensively on local government data in
recent years.
The first one is tlie traditional 'spill-over' or
'externality' model, which expenditure on local public
services in ajurisdiction can liave beneficial or harmful
effects onto residents in nearby jurisdictions (Gordon,
1983).  As an example is local expenditure on pol ice
serv ices .  Us ing  US count l ,  da ta ,  Ke le j ian  and
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Robinson ( 1993) found that police expenditures in a
given county are signi f icant ly and posit ively
influenced by neighboring county police expenditures.
Since counties inflict a negative externality on their
neighbors by spending more on police services due
to cross-over between the borders, the need for police
services in a given county tends to increase due to
increasing of services in neighboring counties.
S e c o n d ,  s p a t i a l  i n t e r a c t i o n  a m o n g  l o c a l
jurisdictions in the form oftax competition arises when
public spending was fund through tax on mobile
capital by local governments (Wildasin, 1986). Since
the level of the tax base in a jurisdiction depends
both, on own and otherjurisdiction' tax rates, strategic
interaction results. Brueckner ( 1 998) found evidence
of policy interdependence in the adoption of growth
cont ro l  measures  among Ca l i fo rn ia  c i t ies .  By
restricting the amount of developable land, a city
government increase land rent both in its own and in
nearby cities, thereby generating an externality and
strategic interaction in growth control decisions. By
using a panel data set of the US states, Figlio et al.
(1999) found that decentralized welfare benefit
setting deteriorates interstate competition and might
induce states to respond asymmetr ical ly to the
changes in their neighbors' policies.
Finally, a recent justification for the existence of
interaction at the local level is the political agency -
that is yardstick competition model. In such model,
the imperfectly informed voters in a localjurisdiction
use other governrnents' performance as a yardstick
to evaluate their orvn government (Salmon, 1987).
Politicians are therefore sensitive to their local tax
performance relative to similarly situated states. Then
they try not to get too far out of line with policies in
those jur isdict ions (Oates, 1988).  The result  is local
authorities imitating each other's behavior.
Recent ly ,  the  ex ten t  to  wh ich  geograph ic
proximity or either similari|l criteria matteq although
is also an empirical question that has attracted some
interest by applied economists. Case et al. (1993)
estirnated a public expenditure quation using a panel
data set of the US states' budget over the period of
1970-85. While they can reject the hypothesis of
expenditure spillovers among geographical neighbors,
they found a strong ernpirical evidence to support
the mimicking hypothesis: state expenditures are
similar in terms of demographic omposition.
Besley and Case (1995) presented a pol i t ical
agency model where voters and politicians are case
sensitive to events outside their boundaries and tested
their yardstick competition hypothesis on US states'
income taxes from 1960 to 1988. They found that
geographic neighbor'tax changes have a positive and
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significant effect on a given state's tax changed.
Heyndels and Vuchelen ( 1998) tested the tax imitation
hypothesis at the level of Belgian municipalities and
found strong positive spatial correlation in local
income tax rates between neighboring authorities.
Bivand and Szymanski ( 1 997; 2000) showed that
there was spatial dependence in the cost of domestic
garbage collection in the UK districts due to contracts
based on the performance comparison and that spatial
interaction were substantially reduced after the
introduct ion of CCT (Compulsive Competi t ive
Tendering), that imposed standard contracting rules
and reduced the scope for local authorities to pursue
idiosyncrat ic pol ic ies. Muri l lo (2003) tested for
s t ra teg ic  in te rac t ion  among US s ta tes  in  the
detemination oftax rates on capital income. He found
that states have a positively sloped reaction function
to the tax policies of rival states when tax rates are
chosen simultaneously.
To sum up, those various studies suggest hat
geograph ical proxim ity defi n ite ly matters to analy ze
fiscal interdependence amongregions. In line with those
studies, we will try to apply their approaches to analyze
the fiscal competition in Indonesia nd try to provide
a deeper explanation. Furthermore, it could stimulate
other researchers tore-estimate by using more sophis-
ticated devices. Final objective is that the figure of
local government budget will be more comprehensive
for policy makers to address the related issues.
There are many indices to describe how great
the inequality is, One of them is Entrophy Index
developed by Theil in 1967. The most significant
characteristic ofthe Entrophy Index is that the index
can distinguish between- and within-region inequality.
In the context of regional (fiscal) disparity in
Indonesia, it could be formulated as follows (Kuncoro.
2002:89):
ETI (y ) :  S ,= , * ,  y ,  ' l og  [y , ,N ]  ( l )
where ETI(y) is the overall spatial disparity
Entrophy Index for per capita regional income (or
fiscal variables), y, is the share of municipality income
(fiscal) in province i on the total per capita real income
(fiscal) in Indonesia, and N is the number of total
municipality in Indonesia.
Furthermore, a standard empirical model of local
public finance determination is usually expressed, in
a linear specification, as:
Y : X , + p  ( 2 )
where y is a vector of public finance variables of
N local governments, X is a (NxK) matr ix of
explanatory variables, 2 is vector of parameters to
be estimate, and p is an error term that is assumed to
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be identically and independently distributed across
the observations.
To fo rmal ly  tes t  the  presence o f  spa t ia l
autocorrelation due to spatial ag or eror dependence,
it's necessary to perform several specification tests.
The literature on spatialeconometric testing is widely
and has suggested several ways for identifoing these
effects (see, for example: Anselin, 1988). The first
specification test proposed is the Moran (1950) I's
test. The Moran's I statistic for testing the null
hypothesis that there are no spatial effects.
In general, spatial autocorrelation takes the form
as follows:
e ,  :  lWe,  *  n , ,  (3 )
where e 
, 
is mean difference of a given variable,
let say X,, from mean value in the corresponding roup
in the period t. The component of e, could be also
the residual generated from the regiession model,
The fo rm o f  I  represents  the  coef f i c ien t  o f
autocorrelation, W is aweight given to geographically
nearer regions, and n is the new disturbance terms.
The statistical test of spatial autocorrelation could
be done in the following steps. (see:Anselin,lg99).
The first step is to construct a (NxN) matrix linking
all regions based on the location. Second, put 0 (null)
in the main diagonal ofthe matrix connecting the same
region. Third, put 1 (one) in the matrix when the two
regions have a border. Forth, each element in the
matrix is then normalized so that sum of total is 1
(one). Fifth, the sum of the row is used as weisht
(W) in the Moran's I statistics calculation:
' {[4,6, w,, (e,,) (e,,)] / [e,ei wii]]
M I =
{ [6,  (e, ,)2 /  nJ]
where W is a row-standardized weights matrix,
N is the number of observations, K is the number of
independent var iables, and M: I  -  X(X'X)-1X,.
Mathernatically, Moran's I statistics lies between
- I and 1 (- I < MI < I ). As indicator, the value of the
Moran's I  stat ist ics closes to +l  shows that the
stronger the spatial positive autocorrelation, in the
sense that the obseruation values tend to close to
each other in the corresponding location. On the
contrary the value of Moran's I statistics close to *
I indicates negative spatial autocorelation, in the
sense that the observation values do not tend to close
to each other in the corresponding location. Meanwhile,
the val ue of Moran's I statistics close to zero presenting
tha t  the  observa t ion  va lues  are  randomly
distributed (independent) among regions.
In theory, the mean value of the Moran,s I
statistics ir E,ru, = - I /(n- I ) and tl.re standard deviation
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is SDlr,rr; : (2lh,h, Wu)"'. The test of significance
Moran's I statistics is done by comparing between
the Ml-calculated and E,r,.,:
IMI _ E(Mr)]
M I  . .
ca lcu la ted
SD,",,
It will be normally distributed (distribution Z-
statistics). The significance of Moran's I statistics
give a signal that spatial effect plays an important
role in the subsequent analysis.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Before presenting the results, a word about datais
in order. Data on actual municipal Gross Domestic
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Product (GDP) per capita without oil and gas in
refere to constant price of 1 993 published by Central
Bureau of Statistics were used to test the existence
of polarization among Indonesian municipalities. Data
of fiscal performance from the same sources are
taken from Regional Financial Statistics. All variables
were transformed into actual per capita term.
The samples period of 1988-2003 covered 80
percent of total municipalities, were divided into 2
sub-periods, 1988-2001 and200l-2003, in effortsto
provide more complete picture about the dynamics
of relative income and fiscal distributions before and
after fiscal decentralization. Separating this period is
also required by Chow test. Table 1 configures the
complete definition of all economic variables, which
willbe used in this study.
s)
Table l .  The Definit ion of Operational Variables in the Research
Notation Definit ion Detai led Variables Unit
LOR Local Ou,rr Revenue
Revenue sharing
Alocation Fund
Total Transfbr
Total Rer.'enue
Operating Expenditures
Capital Expenditures
Total Expend itr.rres
Regional Inconre
Regional Plice Deflator'
Local taxes and chalges. local government orvned
enterprises protit. and other revenues
Tax and non ta\ reveuues sharing. inclLrding land and
build ing taxes. personal income taxes. fbrest.
tlsheries. and oil and gas revenues.
Betbre 2001: Autoltolt ' lous Regional Subsidies.
Re-gional Development grants. Inpres.
AtieL 2001: General Alocation Fund and Special
Alocation Fund,
R S + A F
L O R + R S + A F
Realization of operating expenditules
Realization of capital expend itures
O E + C E
Regional GDP lvi thout oi land 
_sas
Ratio betu'een RGDP in current price and RGDP in
constant price
Real per capita
(rnillion rupiah)
Real per capita
(rnil l ion rupiah)
Real per capita
(nil l ion lupiah)
Real per capita
(mill ion rupiah)
Real per capita
(mill ion rLrpiah)
Real per capita
(mill ion rupiah)
Real per capita
(rnillion LLrpiah)
Real per capita
(rri l l ion rupiah)
Real per capita
(rnil l ion rupiah)
1993 = 100
RS
A T
TT
TR
OE
CE
TE
Table 2 shows Theil's Entrophy index of the
selected fiscal variables and income per capita during
last l6 years. In general, all of indices cousistently
increase. Looking merely at the magnitude, the Theil
Entrophy index of percapita regional income (Y) was
the greatest. In contrast, the Theil Entrophy indices
for revenue sharing (RS) and LOR were the lowest.
It indicates that RS andLORwererelatively distributed
equally; in comparison with the disparity of percapita
regional income which was distributed unequally.
Table 2. Theil  Entrophy Index of Local Government Budget and Regional Income, 1988-2003
TECEOETTA FRS LORYear
r988
1989
I 990
1.812 ' l
r .8920
2.0220
2.1720
2. 52 55
2 . 6 1 3 8
2.5253
2.58 l  8
2.6779
t.79',70
1.8407
t .8776
t  t l l t
t .+ )  t )
2.4s84
2 .1300
2 . l l 9 l
2.3005
2.5652
2.5930
z.ooJ /
6.0'102
6.0621
6.0122
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199 I
1992
I 993
1994
I 995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
200 I
2002
2003
2.0542
2.1193
2.2288
2.2836
2.3056
2.3306
2.38 35
2.21t6
2.2861
2.5460
3 . 1 4 3 r
3 . 1 5 4 8
3.2t92
2.6609
z .  t + ) L
2.7980
2.8102
2.823'7
2.8500
2.93 8
2.840r
2.9343
3. t240
3 .3505
i., l I 05
3.7.105
2.72'73
2.8 r48
2.87 52
2.9006
2.9201
2.9484
3.02 58
2.9240
3.00 82
3.2 rr0
3.4793
3.52 rr
3.8068
l . 9 l  08
1.9436
r . 9 9 1 5
2.0643
2 .1376
2.1768
2 .1 ' /  4 l
2.2092
2.2732
2 . 3 7  t l
2 .4169
2.3406
2 .3111
2.47 44
2.5495
2.6355
2.6829
2 . ' i l 2 2
2.71,+9
2.8274
2.7420
2.8213
3.0 i l0
3.2196
3.3 r 55
3.4291
2.4603
2.5894
2.5926
2.5969
2.6086
2.6327
2.6862
t < t t <
2.6000
3.0r  66
3.  I  625
3.2849
3.3299
2.7't83
2.8501
2.8985
2.92'74
2.9519
2.9826
3.05 42
2.91'73
3 . 0 r 5 5
3.2942
3.45 30
3.5644
3.64 l0
6 .0919
6.1146
6. t472
6.18'/2
6.2236
6.2539
6.3606
6.3137
6.3285
6.33 59
6.3805
6.3736
6.3983
Source: CBS (recalculated)
Table 3 delivers the result of spatial correlation
test for selected variables. The Moran's I statistic
values of al l  the var iables were posit ive. These
positive values of Moran's I statistics imply that the
spatial autocorrelation is getting stronger to the same
direction and the observation values tend to become
similar among regions in a particular area. Compared
to LOR, the value of Moran's I statistics was the
lowest among the four variables tested.
In term of significance, the calculated Moran's I
statistics values, except forLOR, were biggerthan the
Z-table normal distribution at 95 percent confidence
level, It indicated that spatial corelation was mattered
especially in total expenditures, intergovernmental
transfers, and percapitaregional income. Implicitly, it
could be interpretedthat local government expenditures
in a. particular egion positively affects fiscal behavior
in the geographical ly nearby areas. Thi s was in line with
theprevious tudies conducted byLadd ,1992; Heyndels
and Vuchelen, 1998; Revel l i .  2000: Sole. 2001 .
Table 3. The Results of Spatial Correlat ion Test of the Selected Variables
Year LOR Z-test TT TE Z-test l' Ltest
1988
l 989
I 990
199 I
t992
I  993
1994
I 995
t996
t997
l 998
1999
2000
200 I
2002
2003
Chorv
F-Test
0.0572
0.0434
0.0404
0.0530
0.0488
0.045 7
0.0589
0.0628
0 .0581
0.0677
0.0586
0,0592
0.0732
0.0900
0.  t45 I
0.2066
1.2672
0.9396
0.8696
t . t 6 7  1
t.0692
0.9950
r.3060
r .398 r
t.2882
r . 5 t 3 8
1.2992
1 . 3 1 3 9
t.6414
2.0422
J , J + I I
4.7917
0.3705
0.395 
0.4659
0 . 5 3 1 7
0.5273
0.5646
0.6044
0.5 80 3
0.5924
0.4956
0.389.1
0,3340
0.2994
0.3312
0. I 994
0.035 r
8.6669
9.2579
10.92 l0
12.4761
I  2.3 705
t3.2526
14.  I  936
13.6235
r3 .9091
1.62t3
9.1t29
7.806 I
6.9874
7.809 I
,1.6251)
0.7 437
9.2850
10.3 180
l  1.4065
t0.9948
9.6083
I  1 .9882
13.6177
13.0097
t2 .7556
|  1.0127
9.4999
7 .9185
6.9467
7.6001
6.7444
6.55 I  4
0.2359
0.2091
0.2127
0.2000
0.  |  880
0. I 795
0 .1425
0.1499
0,  I  345
0.0913
0 .1057
0.t026
0.0896
0 . r 8 6 1
0 . 1 9 0 r
0. I 964
5.488 
4.8557
4.9389
1.6395
1.3568
4. r 560
3.2812
3.4572
3.091 6
2 .1435
2 .4111
2.338 7
2.0308
+ , J  r l / -
4.4068
,1.5543
t58 .9710
0.3961
0.4404
0.4865
0.1690
0 .4  r03
0 . 5 1  I  I
0 .58 r  3
0.5543
0.5436
0.4698
0.4057
0.338 
0.2977
0.325 3
0.289 r
0.2809
l .  |  708 r  08 .34185.1921
Note: cr i t ical value of Z-table for a: 5 percent is 1.645
crit ical value of F-table lbr a :  5 percent is 4.54
The absence of spatial effect on LOR collection
would be a materialization of fiscal centralization
policy which had been implemented previously. The
Z-value in the corresponding periods was less than
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Z-table value in 95 percent level of confidence. In
those periods, objects, items, and tariffs in LOR had
been decided by central government and equally
implemented for all local governments.
In accordance with fiscal decentralization era
since 2001, the spat ial  ef fects would have been
significant. It was confirmed by Cliow test using 2001
as breaking year.
Those phenomena indicate that the surrounding
areas influen ce realization of the LOR collection. It
seems that realization of the LOR collection in a
par t i cu la r  loca l  government  wou ld  became a
reference for others to determine realization of the
LOR collection in the next period. In tlre long run, it
would induce local tax competition among local
governments altd in turn stimulate the high cost
economy (Saad, 2003).
Further,  lve discovered that there was a close
relationship between unequal econotnic variables
CONCLUSION
By using panel data on the Indonesian local
government, this paper has explored the source of
spatialauto-correlation i  local pLrblic finance. The
results ofthe analysis found that the fiscal competition
among municipalities were greater compared to the
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distribution and their spatial correlations, as described
in figure 1. It is notable that in general the increase in
LOR unequal distribution associates with the increase
in LOR interdependence among regions. Second, the
increase of local government expenditures in total
were un-equally supported by transfers associate with
the decrease in their interdependences among regions.
This condition was strengthening especially after 1 998"
Third, the increase in regional income disparity corre-
lates to its interdependence in the opposite direction.
Howeveq after regional autonomy era, this correlation
changed to parallel direction. Those indicate that fiscal
equalization in regional autonomy and fiscal ciecen-
tral ization era requires a decl ining of the degree of fi scal
interdependence amon gmun icipal ities. On the contrary
the regional income equalization using localgovem-
ment expend itures i nstrument, induced by intergovern-
mental transfers, requires an increasing ofthe degree
of fi scal interdependence among municipalities.
pre-fi scal decentralization period.
I t  seems that the local tax sett ing and local
government expenditures decisions in a particular
municipality were mimicking on the behavior of
neighbor egions. Fufihermore, the spatial interaction
is negatively correlated to the fiscaldisparity. Those
imply tliat in the regional autonomy era, the local
Figure l .  Relat ionships between Entrophy Theil  Index and Moran's I  Stat ist ics
Local Own Revenue, Total Transfer, Total Expenditure, and Regional Income,
t988-2003
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governments tend to increase both their local own
revenue intensively and intergovernmental grants, in
order to finance their expenditures. In the long run,
this could lead to the high cost economy, worsening
f isca l  dependency  and ine f f i c iency  in  loca l
government expenditures.
Above findings suggested thatthe distribution of
intergovernmental transfers among regions should
consider as local tax effort and minimum standard of
services have to play an irnportant role in spending
the local government expenditures efficiently.
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